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Once upon a time there was a struggling young California band.
Its music was too loud and its image too unpolished for MTV.
Its social and political messages were a little too disturbing for
radio. But it built a passionate following among underground-
rock fans by touring relentlessly, staying true to its message and
encouraging fans to record its live shows and distribute bootlegged
tapes as widely as possible. Metallica, once copyright poor, ... filed
a copyright infringement suit against Napster. (The Nation, July
24, 2000)
1 Introduction
In copyrighted goods markets, such as music, artists of diﬀerent status lev-
els typically have opposing views on what the appropriate level of copyright
protection should be. Specifically, established artists seem to favor stronger
copyright protection than relatively unknown or new artists – a conflict of
interest that seems to be growing. For example, more than 70 well-established
artists organized a group called Artists Against Piracy to launch a nation-
wide anti-Napster campaign. In Britain the same coalition was led by Paul
McCartney and Elton John, who are the richest and the second richest rock
stars.1
Interestingly, while most of the stars were against digital copying, rel-
atively unknown artists endorsed Napster for its promotional role for new
artists. That is, the less-known recording artists and professionals briefed the
court in support of Napster, saying that “Napster is a great vehicle and tool
for new artists and independent labels that are desperately in need of access to
the public ear,” and “the increase in the number of people listening to music
means a better chance in an increase in the demand for the music and for live
performances.”2 In a survey, 43 percent of the artists agreed that “file-sharing
services aren’t really bad for artists, since they help to promote and distribute
an artist’s work to a broad audience.”3
The populist view that well-known artists are not happy about consumer
piracy may not be surprising, but the cause and eﬀect of possibly excessive
1More recently, over 50 high-profile artists signed on to the amicus brief urging the courts
to find P2P systems such as Grokster liable for copyright infringement.
2Declarations of Michael E. Lawrence and Randy J. Nichols in support of defendant
Napster. See also declarations of Steven W. Isaacs, Lawrence W. Railey, and Jim Guerinot.
<http://news.lp.findlaw.com/legalnews/lit/napster/index3.html>.
3Pew Internet & American Life Project. Press Release 12/5/2004.
<http://www.pewinternet.org/press_release.asp?r=94>.
copyright protection seems to have been neglected in the literature. While
various theoretical and empirical works have addressed the sales displacement
issue, most of them have not emphasized that the vested interest might try
to use copyright protection strategically, which has implications for diﬀerent
types of players in the market. This paper puts forth some insights gained from
the theory of strategic entry deterrence in order to understand the conflict of
interest involved in copying and copyright protection.
My approach is based on considering complementary markets. There
are mainly three sources of income in the music industry: recorded albums,
radio broadcasting, and live performances. The latter two markets are what
we refer as the complementary market, while the market for recorded music
is the primary market. Artists get income mainly from albums and concerts,
and music companies get income mainly from albums and broadcasting. In the
following, my discussion is adapted to the perspective of artists for expositional
clarity, however, the same analysis would apply if I instead considered music
companies as the players and broadcasting as the complementary market.
Connolly and Krueger (2005) present evidence that a large share of
celebrities’ incomes have been generated from such complementary activities
as live performances, and that the market for live concerts is highly concen-
trated.4 Since the revenue generated from this complementary market can be
surprisingly large, the focus of the incumbents may not be so much on their
primary market, but on the less obvious complementary market.5 Thus, nar-
rowly focusing on the sales substitutability in the primary market may not
appropriately address overall market behavior and the impact of copyright
policy.
The link between primary and complementary markets can be explained
by the so-called economics of superstars (Rosen 1981).6 Since people prefer
to go to concerts put on by superstars as opposed to little-known artists,
introducing live performances in addition to recordings would increase the
overall returns to superstars.7 On the other hand, a new artist needs a large
4The idea that you can use one activity to prove your ability and another activity to make
a profit applies more generally. For example, best-selling novels are made into movies; pop-
ular programs draw more advertisements; and successful open-source programmers receive
high-wage oﬀers.
5Mortimer and Sorensen (2005) show that artists may switch their eﬀorts toward live
performances from album productions.
6This theory observes that, at the top of the talent distribution where the superstars are
found, a small diﬀerence in talent is associated with large diﬀerences in revenue resulting in
skewed income distribution.
7Here I am referring to live concerts at large venues. There are of course many small-
venue live performances, but those tend to be less lucrative and incorporating them would
audience listening to her music to become a star and profit from live concerts.
Thus, the incumbent would have more incentive to suppress the entrant’s
success, and this leads to more entry deterrence in the primary market.
Copying promotes the artist and album by lowering consumer search
costs; that is, increased exposure boosts demand for the album. Gopal et al.
(2006) and Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006a) formalize the idea that allowing pre-
purchase sampling may even increase record sales. As I assume in the model,
copying has a positive eﬀect on building a fan base without the traditional
means of promotion, such as TV and radio. Although a bootlegged album
does not contribute to an artist’s sales profit, all other things being equal,
it provides recognition, which increases the possibility of participating in the
complementary market.
The conventional wisdom of earlier literature is that copyright protection
increases the artist’s profit, and this in turn spurs the supply of creative works.
This, however, does not distinguish established artists from potential entrants
and might be flawed by the conflict of interest between the two types of artists.
This paper explains why the incumbent may advocate strong copyright pro-
tection and shows that extending excessive protection can hurt the incentive of
potential artists to create. Although a similar argument can be made without
the complementary market, my approach incorporates the above evidence and
yields the same net prediction.8
My first result is that a complementary market causes the incumbents
to prefer stronger copyright protection than is needed to maximize their sales
profit in the primary market. Thus, an incumbent would choose to reduce the
entry probability even if it hurts his own primary-market profit. By setting
the level of protection high, the incumbent impairs demand for the entrant’s
album, making it more diﬃcult for the entrant to achieve stardom. My second
result is that if the entrant can deviate and profitably opt out of the copyright
system, then this can mitigate the incumbent’s strategic behavior. Because
the opt-out choice increases the entrant’s outside option, the incumbent must
accommodate more types to enter as well as to opt in.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly
mentions the relevant literature. Section 3 lays out the model, and section
4 contains the main result. Section 5 extends the model to incorporate the
not change the main results.
8Suppose, for example, the artist competes only in the primary market, but over multiple
periods. If an unsuccessful first album prevents the entrant from producing a second album,
as is often the case, then the incumbent would still have an incentive to suppress the exposure
of unknown artists to reduce future competition in album sales. In this case, the subsequent
album serves as the complementary product.
entrant’s opt-out choice. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The classic trade-oﬀ that optimal IP protection must strike a balance be-
tween the incentive to create and monopoly distortion has been at the center
of copyright policy debates.9 A distinct issue regarding copyrights is that
copying allows end-users to directly infringe the copyrights, thus, the level of
protection is important for consumers as well as for producers.10 Novos and
Waldman (1984) showed that increasing copyright protection can reduce the
social welfare loss due to underproduction; Johnson (1985) similarly found
that protection can increase consumer welfare as larger revenue induces an
increase in supply.
However, the literature has also noted some benefits of copying, or costs
associated with copyright protection. In particular, the literature on indirect
appropriability (e.g., Liebowitz 1985, Besen and Kirby 1989, and Takeyama
1997) showed that the seller could appropriate the surplus of copiers by selling
the initial units of the original product at a higher price. Landes and Posner
(1989) argued that copyrights could impose a social cost because most creative
works were based on existing ones. Boldrin and Levine (2007) showed that
in general equilibrium the stock of innovation was lower with a monopoly on
intellectual property than without it.
The work closest to ours is that of Ben-Shahar and Jacob (2004). They
discuss a strategic aspect of copyright protection where the incumbent tries
to deter the entrant by selectively enforcing copyrights in one market but
not in the others. In essence, the incumbent engages in predatory pricing,
which makes it harder for the entrant to recoup her fixed costs. However, this
seems somewhat inconsistent with the real world as rarely do we see incumbent
artists discard copyrights and oﬀer their products at predatory low prices. My
approach demonstrates instead that the incumbent prefers stronger copyright
protection to deter entry.11
9See, for example, Akerlof et al. (2002), and Liebowitz and Margolis (2005) regarding
the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998; Boldrin and Levine (2002), Klein et al. (2002),
and Romer (2002) regarding the Napster case.
10I do not attempt to survey the copyright literature here. Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006b)
provide an excellent survey.
11The current paper is also related to the large literature on entry deterrence, especially
one that emphasizes “raising the rival’s costs” (Salop and Scheﬀman 1983). In my model,
the incumbent can preempt copyright policy to impair the demand of new artists’ albums
and preserve the monopoly stardom.
3 The Model
This section lays out a simple game-theoretic model that is loosely based on
Novos and Waldman (1984). There is one incumbent star and one potential
entrant, designated as he and she, respectively. Both are risk neutral and
thus maximize expected profit. The star can produce an album of quality Q¯,
but the quality of the potential entrant, Q, is uncertain prior to entry. Q is
uniformly distributed on the interval [Q
¯
,Q¯], and F (Q) denotes its distribution.
The entrant must incur a fixed entry cost, F , to produce her album, whereas
the incumbent has already sunk the cost. To make things nontrivial, the entry
cost is neither low nor high enough to guarantee or block the entry.
Recorded music that the artists create is copyrightable and thus pro-
tected from copyright infringements. However, copyright protection is not
perfectly enforced. For example, digital copying is widespread, and the gov-
ernment or the court can consider shutting down the file-sharing systems or
increasing the infringement fine. Formally, denote the level of copyright pro-
tection asH ∈ [0, 1], whereH = 0 is minimal andH = 1maximum protection.
I assume that the incumbent can influence the copyright policy to set the level
of copyright protection he desires. This can be due to the incumbent’s lobby-
ing.12
The potential entrant then makes her entry decision. If she enters, both
artists produce albums at a constant marginal cost c to sell in the primary
market.13 If the potential entrant stays out, she earns a zero profit and only
the incumbent produces. Artists, as copyright holders, can charge a monopoly
price, p, for their albums; and, when they set the price, they consider the sales
substitution due to illicit copying. I assume that the seller cannot indirectly
expropriate the surplus up front by charging a higher price for the first unit
of the album. Hence, the seller does not price discriminate, but must charge
a uniform price to all consumers.
On the demand side, there are two groups of consumers for each artist’s
album. The two groups diﬀer by their valuation of musical items. Individuals
in group 1 have a high valuation, vh, while those in group 2 have a low val-
uation, vl. In plain terms, group 1 represents music fans, and group 2 is the
general public who derives small utility from listening to music. The size of
group 2 is normalized to unity, and the size of group 1 is a state variable, x.
12There seems to be limited scope for potential entrants’ lobbying because entrants cannot
devote enough resources to influence, and they are less organized to overcome the free-rider
problem. Although it might be useful to model such lobbying process, it is beyond the scope
of this paper.
13I abstract from the contractual relationship between artists and record labels and treat
them as the same entity. See, e.g., Caves (2003) and Gayer and Shy (2006) for this.
Copyright protection impairs the demand by reducing exposure; on the other
hand, the album quality has a positive eﬀect on the demand. Therefore, the
actual demand of the high valuation group is γ(H,Q)x, where γH < 0, γQ > 0.
Individual consumers also vary by their cost of copying. A parameter,
z, represents an individual’s cost of obtaining a copy, and the continuum of
individuals are assumed to be distributed on the interval [0, Z] with respect to
this dimension. The consumer’s cost of copying can reflect a variety of factors;
for example, people might have diﬀerential access to copying technologies,
varying opportunity costs, and diﬀerent beliefs regarding copyrights. The cost
is private information and only its distribution is known to the artists. For the
sake of simplicity, the distribution, U(z), of z in each group is identical and
uniform on [0, Z].
Each individual buys at most one album per artist, but both albums can
be purchased because albums are diﬀerentiated products and usually not too
expensive. Thus, the artists do not directly compete in the primary market.14
Consumers gain utility vQ − e from an album. The cost, e, of obtaining
an album depends on the mode of consumption: if the individual buys the
original, then it is the market price, e = p, but, if he copies, he incurs a
reproduction cost, e = c+ z +H, instead. I assume that the general public’s
valuation, vl, is suﬃciently low, and the fan clubs’ valuation, vh, is suﬃciently
high (c+Z
2
+ 1
2
< vhQ
¯
), so that the artists sell only to high-valuation consumers.
If the entrant is successful and becomes a star, then she has access to
the complementary market; for example, only those who have produced a hit
album can earn a large profit from going on tour.15 The entrant’s probability
of achieving stardom is w(q,Q) ∈ (0, 1), which depends positively on the mar-
ket penetration, q, measured by the total consumption, and the quality of the
album, Q. The specific structure of the complementary market is not modeled
here, but competition in the complementary market is more direct since con-
cert tickets are expensive.16 The incumbent gains a monopoly complementary
profit ΠM > 0 if there is no entry. If the entrant becomes a star, each earns a
duopoly profit αΠM , where 0 < α < 1 measures the degree of competition.
14This seems realistic in the sense that adding an album to the long music catalog is
not likely to have a large eﬀect on primary-market competition. Even if the artists were
to compete in the primary market, the incumbent may prefer copyright protection to low
prices as a strategic instrument.
15Since there would be a fixed cost for performing at a large venue, non-star artists would
not sell enough concert tickets to cover this cost, thus, I simply assume that they stay out
of this market.
16Similarly, if we were to consider music companies that receive broadcasting royalties,
then having songs aired over the radio is likely to be more competitive than selling CDs as
long as stations tend to play songs by well-known artists.
The timing of the game is as follows. In period 1, nature decides the state
of the demand, and the incumbent determines the level of copyright protection
that will prevail until the game ends. Then the potential entrant decides
whether to enter, active artists produce and sell their recorded music, and
consumers decide whether to buy, copy, or do neither. In period 2, the entrant
becomes a star with some probability. Stars participate in the complementary
market, and the game ends. The solution concept is subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium, and there is no discounting between the periods.
4 Analysis
Consider the benchmark case in which there is no complementary market in
the second period (ΠM = 0). Consumers would pay up to vQ, but they would
copy rather than purchase the original when their copying cost is less than
the market price; that is, c + z + H < p. Since z is a random variable, the
demand function of group 1 is D(p) = xγ(H,Q)(1−U(p− c−H)) if p ≤ vhQ;
D(p) = 0 if p > vhQ. Given x, H, and Q, the artist’s problem is to maximize
D(p)(p− c) subject to p ≤ vhQ. The first-order condition is that the marginal
revenue equals the marginal cost, which comes from the last unit of demand
substituted by a copy.
It is easy to see that the optimal monopoly price is p∗ = c + H+Z
2
with
a corresponding profit of Π∗(x,H,Q) = xγ(H,Q)Z (
H+Z
2
)2. Thus, high-valuation
consumers for whom z < p∗ − c − H, or z > p∗ − c − H would respectively
copy or buy the item. In contrast, low-valuation consumers would copy if
z < vlQ− c−H, but abstain from consumption if z > vlQ− c−H. The only
diﬀerence for the two types of artists is that the potential entrant will stay out
if Π∗ < F .
One thing to note here is that copyright protection, H, and consumers’
copying costs, Z, appear to be substitutes: the monopoly price and profit are
both functions of H+Z. Digital copying may have reduced Z causing a fall in
record sales, but would trying to solve this problem by increasing H instead
result in the same outcome as if increasing Z? The answer may be no. As
I demonstrate below, stronger protection can cause entry deterrence making
the incumbent better oﬀ. Thus, from a social planner’s perspective, it may
not be the most eﬃcient way to deal with consumer piracy.
Since the problem is solved backwards, the incumbent would choose the
level of copyright protection knowing the solution to this record-sales problem.
The potential entrant’s quality, Q, is not known to the incumbent, but the
incumbent would not care because the primary market is not competitive.
Given any state, x, the profit-maximizing level of H is denoted by H◦ =
argmaxH Π∗(x,H,Q). Accordingly, the star has no incentive to deter entry,
and the level of protection is set to maximize the sales profit. In fact, if the
exposure eﬀect of H is the same for all Q, then there is no conflict of interest
between the two types of artists as to the desired level of protection.
Proposition 1. Suppose that ΠM = 0 and γHγ does not depend on Q.
Then in equilibrium both the incumbent and the entrant prefer the same level
of copyright protection, H◦, which maximizes the primary-market profit.
Proof. Since demand for the two albums is assumed to be independent,
the incumbent’s profit does not depend on the potential entrant’s quality or
on the entry decision. The incumbent’s quality is Q¯, and his sales profit
would be Π∗(x,H, Q¯) = xγ(H,Q¯)Z (
H+Z
2
)2 given his own choice of protection,
H, and the realization of demand, x. Likewise, the entrant knows her own
quality, Q, and expects to earn Π∗(x,H,Q) = xγ(H,Q)Z (
H+Z
2
)2 if she enters.
Maximizing this expression over H given x, the first-order condition yields
γH(H,Q)(
H+Z
2
) + γ(H,Q) = 0, the solution of which is independent of Q.
Note that if the entrant cannot profitably enter, then she would be indiﬀerent
regarding H. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 says that, in the absence of the secondary source of income
and as long as the exposure eﬀect is the same for all artists in percentage terms,
the incumbent would not use copyright protection as a strategic tool for entry
deterrence. For some specification of function γ(H,Q), the optimal protection
could be at the corner (H = 1), but this is not because the incumbent wants
to deter the entry of the new artist. Thus, without a loss of generality, I
restrict the model’s parametrization to have a unique interior solution, H◦,
0 < H◦ < 1, that maximizes a concave profit function, Π∗(x,H,Q), which I
maintain throughout this paper.
Now consider the full model in which there is a complementary market
in the second period (ΠM > 0). The entrant’s prospect in the complementary
market depends on her success in the primary market. Note that the incum-
bent is already a star. The entrant’s probability of success, w(q,Q), depends
on the total consumption, q, which measures the population who copied or
bought the entrant’s album. Everyone in group 1 contributes to this measure
because p∗ < vhQ implies that they either copy or purchase the album. In
group 2, only low-cost individuals, z < vlQ − c − H, count because the rest
would abstain. Therefore, q is equal to x+(vlQ−c−H)/Z, which is decreasing
in H since more group 2 individuals abstain as their cutoﬀ value, vlQ− c−H,
decreases.
It is important to note that the total consumption, q, does not depend
on the price, p. Thus, the album price has no eﬀect on the complementary
market prospect, accordingly the artists have no incentive to deviate from
the monopoly-pricing strategy. Given the parameters of the model, the price
aﬀects the degree of sales substitution by copies, but it does not aﬀect the total
size of consumption versus non-consumption, which matters for becoming a
star. Since x and Q are given from the entrant’s perspective, it is the H the
incumbent chooses that determines the size of the total consumption.
To illustrate the main result, let us look at the entrant’s and the in-
cumbent’s problems in turn. The entrant faces her entry decision after x is
realized and H is chosen. The entrant would enter if and only if her expected
profit is larger than F , which is the sum of the first- and second-period profit,
Π∗(x,H,Q) + w(q,Q)αΠM . Both terms are increasing functions of the en-
trant’s quality Q. Thus, there exists a critical value Q∗ ∈ (Q
¯
,Q¯), such that
the entrant will enter if and only if Q > Q∗. From the incumbent’s point of
view, the entrant’s quality is unobserved, so he only knows the entry proba-
bility, P =
R Q¯
Q∗ dF (Q).
Next, consider the incumbent’s decision regarding H. The incumbent’s
expected profit is contingent upon the entry and success of the new artist;
that is, upon entry, the incumbent’s second-period profit is ΠM with proba-
bility 1− w and αΠM with probability w. Thus, if the entrant were to enter,
the incumbent’s expected profit would be Π∗entry(x,H,Q) ≡ Π∗(x,H, Q¯)+(1−
w(q,Q))ΠM + w(q,Q)αΠM . However, if entry does not occur, then he gets
Π∗no_entry(x,H,Q) ≡ Π∗(x,H, Q¯)+ΠM for sure. The incumbent’s problem is to
choose anH that maximizes the expected profit,
R Q∗
Q
¯
Π∗no_entry(x,H,Q)dF (Q)+R Q¯
Q∗ Π
∗
entry(x,H,Q)dF (Q).
Note that the driving force of the main result is not the presence of
the complementary market per se or the existence of the potential entrant.
Without the link between the two markets via the promotional eﬀect, the
incumbent would choose the same level of copyright protection, H◦, as in
the benchmark. For example, if the entry decision and the success probability
were fixed, then the incumbent would just maximize his primary-market profit.
More essential to the incumbent is to choose stronger copyright protection
than H◦ in order to reduce dissemination of the copyrighted album via tighter
copyright protection.
When the entrant’s success depends on the consumption of her album as
in the original model, the new artist would be unambiguously hurt by stringent
copyright protection because her expected complementary as well as primary
profit would fall. The new artist needs more exposure and would actually
prefer lenient copyright protection so more people can listen to her music;
that is, the entrant prefers an H∗E, H
∗
E ≤ H◦, because the expected gain from
wider dissemination is larger than the loss from record sales.
The incumbent, on the other hand, never prefers lenient copyright protec-
tion because that will only reduce his expected complementary income. Thus,
he prefers an H∗I , H
∗
I ≥ H◦ to squeeze the entrant’s total expected profit, even
if doing so may also decrease his own profit from record sales. This shows the
fundamental conflict of interest between the established and the new artist
and suggests that the incumbent may have an incentive to deter entry into the
primary market in the first place. Contrary to conventional wisdom, stronger
copyright protection can discourage potential artists from creating new goods.
Proposition 2. Suppose that ΠM > 0. Then the incumbent would
choose an H∗I , H
∗
I > H
◦, in the unique equilibrium; the probability of entry
at H∗I is lower than at H
◦. In contrast, the entrant’s preferred choice would
be an H∗E, H
∗
E < H
◦.
Proof. First, note that we can restrict the incumbent’s choice set to
[H◦, 1], because for any H 0, H 0 < H◦ he can find an H 00, H 00 > H◦ that yields
the same primary-market profit but larger expected complementary-market
profit. From the entry condition, we know that Π∗(x,H,Q∗)+w(q,Q∗)αΠM =
F defines the critical value Q∗, above which the entrant will enter. Note that
q = x + (vlQ − c − H)/Z, which increases with Q but decreases with H.
Now, implicitly diﬀerentiating both sides of the entry condition with H, we
get ∂Π
∗
∂H +
∂Π∗
∂Q∗
∂Q∗
∂H +[
∂w
∂q
∂q
∂H +
∂w
∂q
∂q
∂Q∗
∂Q∗
∂H +
∂w
∂Q∗
∂Q∗
∂H ]αΠ
M = 0. Since ∂Π
∗
∂H |H=H∗ = 0
and ∂q∂H |H=H∗ < 0, one can check that ∂Q
∗
∂H |H=H∗ > 0.
Consider next the incumbent’s expected profit,
R Q∗
Q
¯
£
Π∗(x,H, Q¯) +ΠM
¤
dF +
R Q¯
Q∗
£
Π∗(x,H, Q¯) + (1− (1− α)w(q,Q))ΠM
¤
dF . Diﬀerentiating with re-
spect toH, we get ∂Q
∗
∂H
£
Π∗ +ΠM
¤
+
R Q∗
Q
¯
∂Π∗
∂H dF−
∂Q∗
∂H
£
Π∗ + (1− (1− α)w)ΠM
¤
+
R Q¯
Q∗
h
∂Π∗
∂H − (1− α)ΠM
∂w
∂q
∂q
∂H
i
dF . Using ∂Q
∗
∂H |H=H◦ > 0, ∂q∂H |H=H◦ < 0 and
∂Π∗
∂H |H=H◦ = 0, this reduces to (1 − α)ΠM [∂Q
∗
∂H w −
R Q¯
Q∗
∂w
∂q
∂q
∂HdF ]|H=H◦ > 0.
Therefore, the incumbent’s profit-maximizing H∗I lies strictly to the right of
H◦. Corresponding cutoﬀ value Q∗ goes up, so that the probability of entry,
P =
R Q¯
Q∗ dF (Q), also decreases.
Similarly, diﬀerentiating the entrant’s expected profit with H yields
∂Π∗
∂H +
∂w
∂q
∂q
∂HαΠ
M = 0. Since ∂q∂H < 0, it must be that
∂Π∗
∂H > 0, which im-
plies that the entrant’s preferred level of protection, H∗E, lies to the left of H
◦.
Note that for some low-quality entrant the net profit can still be negative, in
which case the entrant is indiﬀerent as to the level of protection. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 says that, if the complementary market is an important
source of income, then the incumbent has an incentive to increase the level of
copyright protection beyond the profit-maximizing level for the primary mar-
ket in order to preserve his monopoly in the complementary market. This
strategic use of copyright protection lowers both the incumbent’s and the en-
trant’s sales profit, however, it increases the incumbent’s total expected profit.
The incumbent suppresses the dissemination of the entrant’s album to make it
harder for the entrant to gain access to the complementary market. Therefore,
strong copyright protection (H∗I ≥ H◦) discourages entry in the sense that the
probability of entry is reduced.
The main message of this analysis is simple. While copyright protection,
if adequately set and enforced, could maximize the artists’ profits from sell-
ing their copyrighted works and accommodate new aspiring artists leading to
more competition between stars, excessive protection can serve as a strategic
tool by the established artists who care about the complementary market. An
implication for policymakers is that they should be more cautious about over-
protecting the established to the detriment of new entrants. Although more
protection can reduce illicit copying, it can also reduce product variety and
increase market power.
A simple comparative statics exercise shows that the incumbent’s strate-
gic choice ofH∗I increases as the size of the complementary profit, Π
M , increases
and the degree of competition in that market is higher (α smaller). This means
that the incumbent’s opportunity cost of losing monopoly stardom increases
if entry is not deterred, so that he is more likely to seek stringent copyright
protection. On the other hand, when the demand, x, is high, the incumbent’s
optimal choice, H∗I , decreases because high demand makes it more diﬃcult for
the incumbent to suppress the potential entrant. Note that this means a lower
demand, x, leads to more incentive to deter entry because the opportunity
cost in the primary market is lower.17
Proposition 3. Other things being equal, the incumbent’s choice of H∗I
increases with larger ΠM and smaller α; H∗I decreases with higher state of the
demand, x.
17While such empirical studies as Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) could not reject
the hypothesis that downloads have no eﬀect on overall sales, proposition 3 may provide
an alternative explanation. When the recording demand falls for reasons not related to
copyrights, the incumbent has more incentive to increase copyright protection because there
is less opportunity cost in the primary market.
Proof. The first-order condition of the incumbent’s objective function re-
duces to
R Q¯
Q
¯
∂Π∗
∂H dF+(1−α)wΠM
∂Q∗
∂H −(1−α)ΠM
R Q¯
Q∗[
∂w
∂q
∂q
∂H ]dF = 0. Substitut-
ing ∂Π
∗
∂H =
xγ2(Q)
Z [γ
0
1(H)(
H+Z
2
)2+γ1(H)(
H+Z
2
)], this is xZ [γ
0
1(H)(
H+Z
2
)2+γ1(H)
(H+Z
2
)]
R Q¯
Q
¯
γ2(Q)dF +(1−α)wΠM ∂Q
∗
∂H − (1−α)ΠM
R Q¯
Q∗
h
∂w
∂q
∂q
∂H
i
dF = 0. Since
the second and the third term is positive numbers, the first term must be
negative. Note that x appears in the first term and (1−α)ΠM in the last two
terms. It is easy to see that higher x implies weaker H relative to the optimal
choice, H◦ < H < H∗I . Similarly, larger values of (1 − α)ΠM mean an H,
H > H∗I . Q.E.D.
5 Opt-Out Choice
This section considers the ex-post enforcement issue that is relevant to the
real world. Ex-post enforcement refers to eﬀective copyright protection in the
market after the copyright policy has been set. A crucial question concerning
the above entry-deterrence result is what happens when the entrant can undo
the copyright protection that is determined by the incumbent. Two points
will be made. One is that an arbitrary deviation from the protection policy is
not realistic, but opting out of copyright protection entirely is plausible. The
other is that, if opting out indeed provides a profitable entry opportunity, it
can sometimes constrain the incumbent’s strategic behavior.
First, major actions by the government or the courts aﬀect the system
through which consumers can make copies. For instance, the decision to shut
down Napster aﬀects all artists whether or not they want to circulate their work
on that system. Second, consumers, not the artists, bear the responsibility
to abide by the law and pay the penalty in case of violations. Even if an
artist would like to encourage distribution of bootlegged copies, consumers
have to be equally cautious about copying any artist’s work. Third, there is a
communication problem in that even if some artists want to encourage illicit
copying of their albums and convey this message, such communication might
not be feasible due to the legal environment. Therefore, it is diﬃcult for the
entrant to deviate from the given level of copyright protection as long as the
work is copyrighted.
However, if an artist’s work is not copyrighted in the usual sense, then it
is possible to freely circulate the created work without such concerns as above.
Opting out of copyright protection is a growing phenomenon in creative indus-
tries; there are various legal licenses that make such opt-out choices possible.
“Copyleft” licenses typically allow free use, modification, and distribution of
intellectual properties.18 Thus, new artists may post their songs online at
such social networking sites as MySpace.com and YouTube.com. There are
also open-source record labels (e.g., LOCA Records, Magnatune) that release
albums under copyleft licenses.
Unlike arbitrary deviation from the prevailing policy, these licenses pro-
vide artists a way to enable free reproduction of their goods and still get the
credit for their original creation.19 This is what is referred to here as an opt-
out choice, and it corresponds to marginal-cost pricing of the album, orH = 0,
in terms of the model. I assume that the entrant now has the counterstrategy
of opting out of copyright protection; the entrant can choose either to opt in
(HE = HI) or opt out (HE = 0), where HI is the incumbent’s choice. Thus,
the entrant’s expected profit at HE = 0 becomes her reservation payoﬀ.
To illustrate the eﬀect of the opt-out choice, I assume that the success
probability w(q,Q) is linear in both elements. Then the entrant’s expected
profit function satisfies the single-crossing condition, that is, ∂
2
∂H∂Q [Π
∗(x,H,Q)+
w(q,Q)αΠM ] > 0. This means that the diﬀerence in expected profit due to
type Q is increasing in H. Thus, opting out is relatively more plausible for a
low-quality than for a high-quality entrant. An interpretation is that a low-
quality album will not sell well if copyright protected, so it is relatively better
to hope to recoup the fixed cost under a copyleft regime. A high-quality artist,
on the other hand, has more chance to succeed in the market, so copyleft is
less attractive.
Note that H∗I is the incumbent’s previous choice, and Q
∗ is the entrant
type that is marginally deterred without the opt-out possibility. By the single-
crossing property, there exists a critical value, Θ ∈ (Q
¯
,Q¯), such that the
entrant type Θ would be indiﬀerent between opt-out and opt-in. The eﬀect of
the opt-out possibility on the incumbent’s preference for copyright protection
can be understood intuitively. First, if H∗I promises the type Q
∗ entrant a
larger profit than her reservation payoﬀ, then the opt-out option is not a
binding constraint. H∗I will remain unchanged because no entrant opts out
and the marginal condition is not aﬀected.
18The term “copyleft” refers to the novel licensing scheme as well as the ideological move-
ment that every person will be able to copy, use, modify, and redistribute the product freely
as long as the redistributed work is licensed under the same condition. GNU General Public
License is a copyleft license, of which Linux is a well-known example. Creative Commons
licenses applies to video, audio, and written materials so that authors and artists can post
their work for free distribution.
19Another possibility is to distribute some quantity of albums free as a promotion while
opting in for copyright protection. This, however, would not be eﬀective if those who would
obtain the promotion pack are the likely buyers, so that it would just substitute out the
demand without aﬀecting the total consumption.
Second, the opt-out choice can be a binding constraint. In this case, the
incumbent must loosen the copyright protection because the entrant will enter
anyway by opting out and appeal to a larger audience. This means that there is
less marginal gain at H∗I : those who opt out are not aﬀected by H anymore, so
the incumbent is unnecessarily reducing his primary market profit. Therefore,
he has an incentive to bid down HI . Compared to the equilibrium without
the opt-out choice, more entrant types are allowed to enter at the margin by
opting out, and some higher types will be induced to opt in rather than opt
out.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the entrant has the opt-out choice and
w(q,Q) is linear in both elements. (a) If Θ ≤ Q∗, then HI = H∗I and entry is
accompanied by opting in. (b) If Θ > Q∗, then HI < H∗I and there exists a
value Q0 below (above) which entry is accompanied by opting out (in).
Proof. Taking the derivative of the entrant’s expected profit with respect
to Q and H, we get xγHQ(H,Q)Z (
H+Z
2
)2 +
xγQ(H,Q)
Z (
H+Z
2
) − αΠMwqq(q,Q) vlZ2 −
αΠMwqQ(q,Q) 1Z . Since
∂
∂Q(
γH
γ ) = 0, γHQ =
γQγH
γ > 0. Also, the last two
terms vanish because wqq = 0, wqQ = 0. Therefore,
xγHQ(H,Q)
Z (
H+Z
2
)2 +
xγQ(H,Q)
Z (
H+Z
2
) > 0, that is, the single-crossing property is satisfied, and there
exists a critical value, Θ ∈ (Q
¯
,Q¯), such that the potential entrant typeΘ would
be indiﬀerent between opt-out and opt-in. First, consider the case Θ ≤ Q∗.
This means that the profit from opting out must be smaller than that from
opting in for the marginal type Q∗. Thus, the opt-out choice is not a binding
constraint for the incumbent’s maximization problem. Since all entering types,
Q, Q > Q∗, opt in, the marginal condition at H∗I is not aﬀected. Thus, the
incumbent’s optimal choice remains the same, HI = H∗I .
Second, consider the case Θ > Q∗. Then it must be true that for Q,
Q∗ ≤ Q ≤ Θ, the entrant’s expected profit from opting out exceeds that from
opting in. Thus, with the previous choice of H∗I , entrant types in [Q
∗,Θ]
enter by opting out, and they are not further aﬀected by H because they
opt in. This implies that there is less marginal gain for the incumbent at
H∗I than previously. From the first-order condition,
R Q¯
Q
¯
∂Π∗
∂H |H=H∗I dF + (1 −
α)ΠM [∂Q
∗
∂H w −
R Q¯
Θ
∂w
∂q
∂q
∂HdF ]|H=H∗I <
R Q¯
Q
¯
∂Π∗
∂H |H=H∗I dF + (1 − α)ΠM [∂Q
∗
∂H w −R Q¯
Q∗
∂w
∂q
∂q
∂HdF ]|H=H∗I = 0. Thus, the incumbent is better oﬀ by reducing his
choice of HI , HI < H∗I . At the new equilibrium, the entrant’s opt-out choice
is again characterized by the single-crossing condition: there exists some crit-
ical value Q0, Q0 < Θ, such that she opts out if Q < Q0 and opts in if Q > Q0.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 shows that the availability of the opt-out choice can work
in favor of the potential entrant and mitigate the incumbent’s incentive to deter
entry. Since the opt-out choice essentially creates a participation constraint,
he has to allow more entrant types to enter as well as to switch them to opt
in. Although this choice sometimes provides the entrant a sort of safeguard
against the incumbent’s preemption, the magnitude of this mitigating eﬀect
may be small, or nonexistent, so potential entries still could be deterred.
The opt-out choice is also risky in the sense that a typical artist could
hope to succeed might be just too slim. Moreover, if the entrant has to finance
the entry cost from the financial market, the lender might have reservations
to the borrower’s opt-out choice. We actually see few serious artists produce
copyleft-licensed albums and subsequently gain nationwide recognition. Fi-
nally, the opt-out option can potentially create further tension because the
incumbent would then try to eliminate the possibility of opting out itself.
6 Conclusion
Copyright protection has been a contentious issue both among scholars and
practitioners. Based on the idea that copyrights can suppress the promo-
tion of the potential entrants, this paper has formalized a strategic aspect of
the copyright protection in a two-tiered market. That is, in addition to the
record market, such complementary markets as live performance and radio
broadcasting are important sources of income for the artists and the music
companies. The incumbent may have an incentive to raise the level of pro-
tection to preserve his monopoly as well as to prevent consumer piracy, while
the entrant likely favors lenient protection to encourage dissemination of her
original work. Allowing the entrant to opt out of the copyright regime can
sometimes weaken the incumbent’s subtle incentive to deter entry, but it may
not be fully eﬀective.
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